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Abstract
Deep models are state-of-the-art for many computer vision tasks including image
classification and object detection. However, it has been shown that deep models
are vulnerable to adversarial examples. We highlight how one-hot encoding directly
contributes to this vulnerability and propose breaking away from this widely-used,
but highly-vulnerable mapping. We demonstrate that by leveraging a different
output encoding, multi-way encoding, we decorrelate source and target models,
making target models more secure. Our approach makes it more difficult for adver-
saries to find useful gradients for generating adversarial attacks of the target model.
We present robustness for black-box and white-box attacks on four benchmark
datasets. The strength of our approach is also presented in the form of an attack for
model watermarking by decorrelating a target model from a source model.
1 Introduction
Deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples [1]. Evidence shows that adversarial
examples are transferable [2, 3]. This weakness can be exploited even if the adversary does not
know the target model under attack, posing severe concerns about the security of the models. This is
because an adversary can use a substitute model for generating adversarial examples for the target
model, also known as black-box attacks.
Black-box attacks such as gradient-based attacks [4, 5] rely on perturbing input by adding an amount
dependent upon the gradient of the loss function with respect to the input (input gradient) of a
substitute model. An example adversarial attack is xadv = x+ sign(∇xLoss(f(x)), where f(x)
is the model used to generate the attack. This added “noise” can fool a model although it may not be
visually evident to a human. The assumption of such gradient-based approaches is that the gradients
with respect to the input, of the substitute and target models, are correlated.
Our key observation is that the setup of conventional deep classification frameworks aids in the
correlation of such gradients, and thereby makes these models more susceptible to black-box-attacks.
Typically, a cross-entropy loss, a soft-max layer, and a one-hot vector encoding for a target label are
used when training deep models. These conventions constrain the encoding length and the number of
possible non-zero gradient directions at the encoding layer. This makes it easier for an adversary to
pick a harmful gradient direction and perform an attack from a substitute model.
We aim to increase the adversarial robustness of deep models through model decorrelation. Our
multi-way encoding representation relaxes the one-hot encoding to a real number encoding, and
embeds the encoding in a space that has a dimension that is higher than the number of classes. These
encoding methods lead to an increased number of possible gradient directions, as illustrated in Fig.
1. This makes it more difficult for an adversary to pick a harmful direction that would cause a
misclassification. Multi-way encoding also helps improve a model’s robustness in cases where the
adversary has full knowledge of the target model under attack: a white-box attack. The benefits of
multi-way encoding are demonstrated in experiments with four benchmark datasets.
We also demonstrate the strength of model decorrelation by introducing an attack for the recent model
watermarking algorithm of Zhang et al. [6], which deliberately trains a model to misclassify certain
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Figure 1: Demonstration of the benefit of relaxing and increasing the encoding dimensionality, for a
binary classification problem at the final encoding layer. Ci is the codebook encoding for class i, axis
si represents the output activation of neuron i in the output encoding layer, where i = 1, . . . , l and l is
the encoding dimensionality. The depicted points are correctly classified points of the green and blue
classes. The arrows depict the possible non-zero perturbation directions sign(∂Loss∂si ). (a) 2D 1ofK
softmax-crossentropy setup: Only two non-zero gradient directions exist for a 1ofK encoding. Of
these two directions, only one is an adversarial direction, depicted in red. (b) 2D multi-way encoding:
Four non-zero perturbation directions exist. The fraction of directions that now move a point to the
adversarial class (red) drops. (c) 3D multi-way encoding: A higher dimensional encoding results in a
significantly lower fraction of gradient perturbations whose direction would move an input from the
green ground-truth class to the blue class, or vice versa.
watermarked images. We interpret such watermarked images as transferable adversarial examples.
We demonstrate that the multi-way encoding reduces the transferability of the watermarked images.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
1. We propose a novel solution using multi-way encoding to alleviate the vulnerability caused
by the 1ofK mapping through model decorrealtion.
2. We empirically show that the proposed approach improves model robustness against both
black-box attacks, white-box attacks, and general corruptions.
3. We also show the strength of our encoding framework by attacking a recently proposed
model watermarking algorithm.
2 Related Work
Attacks. Adversarial examples are crafted images for fooling a classifier with small perturbations.
Recently, many different types of attacks have been proposed to craft adversarial examples. We
focus on gradient-based attacks which deploy the gradient of the loss with respect to the input
[4, 7, 8]. Goodfellow et al. [4] propose the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) which generates
adversarial images by adding the sign of the input gradients scaled by , where the  restricts `∞ of
the perturbation. Kuerakin et al. [7] propose the Basic Iterative Method (BIM), which is an iterative
version of FGSM and is also called Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). Madry et al. [5] show that
PGD with randomly chosen starting points within allowed perturbation can make an attack stronger.
Defenses. The goal of the defense is to make a correct prediction on adversarial examples. However,
adversarial defenses can cause obfuscated gradients which are easily broken by Backward Pass
Differentiable Approximation attack [8]. Athalye et al. [8] recommend performing several sanity
tests to check obfuscated gradients for a defense. Madry et al. [5] propose a defense based on the
minimax formulation of adversarial training which has been extensively evaluated and justified. We
also combine our method with the adversarial training and empirically show that our method does
not rely on this fragile obfuscated gradients by following evaluations in [8]. However, the previous
approach uses the conventional one-hot (1ofK) encoding for both source and target models, while
we propose a higher dimensional multi-way encoding that obstructs the adversarial gradient search.
2
3 Our Approach
In this section we will explain our approach using the following notation: g(x) is the target model
to be attacked, and f(x) is the substitute model used to generate a black-box attack for g(x). In the
case of a white-box attack, f(x) is g(x). Canonical attacks like FGSM and PGD are gradient-based
methods. Such approaches perturb an input x by an amount dependent upon sign(∇xLoss(f(x))).
An adversarial example xadv is generated as follows:
xadv = x+ sign(∇xLoss(f(x))), (1)
where  is the strength of the attack. Therefore xadv would be a translated version of x, in a vicinity
further away from that of the ground-truth class, and thus becomes more likely to be misclassified,
resulting in a successful adversarial attack. If the attack is a targeted one, x could be deliberately
moved towards some other specific target class. This is conventionally accomplished by using the
adversarial class as the ground truth when back-propagating the loss, and subtracting the perturbation
from the original input. The assumption being made in such approaches is that their input gradient
direction is similar: ∇xLoss(f(x)) ≈ ∇xLoss(g(x)).
We now present the most widely used setup for training state-of-the-art deep classification networks
comprising of one-hot encoding and softmax. Let the output activation of neuron i in the final
encoding (fully-connected) layer be si, where i = 1, 2, . . . , l and l is the encoding length. Then, the
softmax probability yi of si, the cross-entropy loss, and the partial derivative of the loss with respect
to si are:
yi =
esi∑k
c=1 e
sc
, Loss = −
k∑
i=1
tilog(yi), and
∂Loss
∂si
= yi − ti. (2)
respectively, where k is the number of classes.
Combined with the most widely used one-hot (1ofK) encoding scheme, the derivative in Eqn. 2
makes the gradients of substitute and target models strongly correlated. We demonstrate this as
follows: Given a ground-truth example belonging to class [1,0,. . . ,0], non-zero gradients of neuron
1 of the encoding layer will always be negative, while all other neurons will always be positive
since 0 < yi < 1. So, regardless of the model architecture and the output, the signs of the partial
derivatives are determined by the category, and thus the gradients for that category only lie in a
limited hyperoctant (see Fig. 1 for the 2D case). This constraint causes strong correlation in gradients
in the final layer for different models using the 1ofK encoding. Our experiments suggest that this
correlation can be carried all the way back to the input perturbations, making these models more
vulnerable to attacks.
In this work, we aim to make ∇xLoss(f(x)) and ∇xLoss(g(x)) less correlated by encouraging
model decorrelation. We do this by introducing multi-way encoding instead of the conventional
1ofK encoding used by deep models for classification. Multi-way encoding significantly reduces the
correlation between the gradients of the substitute and target models, making it more challenging for
an adversary to create an attack that is able to fool the classification model.
The multi-way encoding we propose in this work is the Random Orthogonal (RO) output vector
encoding generated via Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization. Starting with a random matrix A =
[a1|a2| . . . |an] ∈ Rk×l, the first, second, and kth orthogonal vectors are computed as follows:
u1 = a1, e1 =
u1
||u1|| , u2 = a2−(a2 · e1)e1, e2 =
u2
||u2|| ,
uk = ak− . . .−(ak · ek−1)ek−1, ek = uk||uk|| .
(3)
For a classification problem of k classes, we create a codebook CRO ∈ Rk×l, where Ci = βei is a
length l encoding for class i, and i ∈ 1, . . . , k, and β is a scaling hyper-parameter dependent upon l.
A study on the selection of the length l is presented in the experiments section.
By breaking away from the 1ofK encoding, softmax and cross-entropy become ill-suited for the
model architecture and training. Instead, we use the loss between the output of the encoding-layer and
the RO ground-truth vector, Loss(f(x), tRO), where f(x) ∈ Rl and Loss measures the distance
between f(x) and tRO. In our multi-way encoding setup, the final encoding (s) and f(x) become
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Table 1: This table presents the effect of increasing the dimension (10, 20, ..., 3000) of the output
encoding layer of the multi-way encoding on the classification accuracy (%) for MNIST on FGSM
black-box, white-box attacks ( = 0.2) and clean data. As the dimension increases, accuracy increases
up to a certain point; We use 2000 for the length of our multi-way encoding layer.
10 20 40 80 200 500 1000 2000 3000
Black-box 45.4 52.4 62.4 71.3 73.7 78.0 79.6 83.6 82.9
White-box 18.1 23.5 27.4 38.8 40.3 39.5 45.8 54.9 45.3
Clean 96.8 97.0 97.9 98.3 98.5 98.8 98.8 99.1 98.9
equivalent. Classification is performed using argmini Loss(f(x), tiRO). We use Mean Squared
Error (MSE) Loss.
Figure 1 illustrates how using a multi-way and longer encoding results in an increased number of
possible gradient directions, reducing the probability of an adversary selecting a harmful direction
that would cause misclassification. For simplicity we consider a binary classifier. Axis si in each
graph represents the output activation of neuron i in the output encoding layer, where i = 1, . . . , l.
The depicted points are correctly classified points for the green and blue classes. The arrows depict
the sign of non-zero gradients ∂Loss∂si . (a) Using a 1ofK encoding and a softmax-cross entropy
classifier, there are only two directions for a point to move, a direct consequence of 1ofK encoding
together with Eqn. 2. Of these two directions, only one is an adversarial direction, depicted in red.
(b) Using 2-dimensional multi-way encoding, we get four possible non-zero gradient directions. The
fraction of directions that now move a correctly classified point to the adversarial class is reduced. (c)
Using a higher dimension multi-way encoding results in a less constrained gradient space compared
to that of 1ofK encoding. In the case of attacks formulated following Eqn. 1, this results in 2l
possible gradient directions, rather than l in the case of 1ofK encoding. The fraction of gradients
whose direction would move an input from the green ground-truth class to the blue class, or vice
versa, decreases significantly. In addition, multi-way encoding provides additional robustness by
increasing the gradients’ dimensionality. The effect of increasing dimensionality is shown in Table 1.
We also combine multi-way encoding with adversarial training for added robustness. We use the
following formulation to solve the canonical min-max problem [5, 9] against PGD attacks:
argmin
θ
[E(x,y)∈ptrain max
δ
(L(θ, x+ δ, y)) + λE(x,y)∈ptrain(L(θ, x, y))] (4)
where ptrain is the training data distribution, (x, y) are the training points, and λ determines a
weight of the loss on clean data together with the adversarial examples at train time. For generating
white-box adversarial attacks to our method, we minimize a variant of Carlini-Wagner (CW) loss [10]:
max
(
min
i6=t
Loss (x, ei)− Loss (x, et) ,−κ
)
(5)
where et is the ground-truth vector, κ is a confidence, and Loss is MSE loss.
4 Experiments
In this work we define a black-box attack as one where the adversary knows the architecture and
the output encoding used but not learned weights. We use two substitute models using 1ofK and
RO encodings respectively to evaluate our method. We define a white-box attack as one where
the adversary knows full information about our model, including the learned weights. We conduct
experiments on four commonly-used benchmark datasets: MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and
SVHN.
The threat model is a `∞ bounded attack within the allowed perturbation : 0.3 MNIST, 8/255.0
CIFAR-10, 8/255.0 CIFAR-100, 10/255.0 SVHN by following [5, 11].
4.1 Multi-way Encoding on MNIST
In this section we provide an in-depth analysis of our multi-way encoding on the MNIST dataset.
We conduct experiments to examine how multi-way output encodings can decorrelate gradients
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Figure 2: We present (a) three sample examples of input gradients from A1ofK , A′1ofK , ARO, and
A′RO models. The gradients of 1ofK models become similar after training while the gradients of
RO models are dissimilar. (b) the correlation coefficients of the gradients at each layer of the models.
RO encoding results in a lower correlation of input gradients between models (model decorrelation).
(Sec. 4.1.1) and increase adversarial robustness (Sec. 4.1.2). We compare models trained on 1ofK
output encodings with models having the same architecture but trained on multi-way output encodings.
In all experiments we use RO encoding as the multi-way encoding with dimension 2000 determined
by Table 1 and β = 1000. All models achieve ∼99% on the clean test set. Models A and C are
LeNet-like CNNs and inherit their names from [12]. We use their architecture with dropout before
fully-connected layers. We trained models A and C on MNIST with the momentum optimizer and
an initial learning rate of 0.01, momentum = 0.5 with different weight initializations. It should be
noted that, in this section, substitute and target models are trained on clean data and do not undergo
any form of adversarial training.
4.1.1 Model Decorrelation
In this section we present how multi-way encoding results in gradient decorrelation. For further
comparison, we train models A′1ofK and A
′
RO, that are independently initialized from the models
A1ofK and ARO. In Fig 2 (a) we present aggregate results on the entire MNIST dataset. We measure
the correlation of gradients between all convolutional layers and the input layer of models trained on
different encodings. We first compute the gradients of the loss with respect to intermediate features
of Conv1 and Conv2. We average gradients of convolutional layers over channels in the same way a
gradient-based saliency map is generated [13]. Otherwise, the order of convolutional filters affects the
correlations and makes it difficult to measure proper correlations between models. Then, we compute
the Pearson correlation coefficient (ρ) of the sign of the gradients with respect to the intermediate
features between models. We find that the correlations of Conv1 and Conv2 between 1ofK models
are much higher than those of RO models. It also shows that the correlations between RO and 1ofK
are also low. In addition, RO models are not highly correlated even though they are using the same
encoding scheme. At the input layer, the correlations between RO and 1ofK are almost zero, but
1ofK models have a significantly higher correlation.
In Fig 2 (b) we visualize the value of the gradients of the loss with respect to input (input gradients)
from the models: A1ofK , A′1ofK , ARO, and A
′
RO, for three sample images from the MNIST dataset.
We observe that the gradients of A1ofK and A′1ofK are more similar than those of ARO and A
′
RO.
Also, the gradients of 1ofK encoding models are quite dissimilar compared to those of RO encoding
models.
4.1.2 Robustness
Table 2 presents the classification accuracy (%) of target models under attack from various substitute
models. Columns represent the substitute models used to generate FGMSM attacks of strength
 = 0.2 and rows represent the target models to be tested on the attacks. The diagonal represents
white-box attacks and others represent black-box attacks. Every cell corresponds to an attack from
a substitute model f(x) for a target model g(x). The last column reports the average accuracy on
black-box attacks.
By comparing the last column of Table 2, the g(x) using the 1ofK encoding is more vulnerable to
black-box attacks than the corresponding g(x) using the RO encoding. Black-box attacks become
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Table 2: This table presents the classification accuracy (%) of MNIST on black-box and white-box
FGSM attacks using architectures A and C. f(x) is a substitute model and g(x) is a target model.
We conclude: (a) g(x) using 1ofK is more vulnerable to black-box attacks than g(x) using RO. (b)
For white-box attacks, RO encoding leads to better accuracy compared to 1ofK. (c) In brackets is
the correlation coefficient of the input gradients of g(x) and f(x). RO results in a lower correlation
compared to 1ofK.
g(x)
f(x)
A1ofK ARO C1ofK CRO AVG BB
A1ofK 34.9 (1.00) * 93.6 (0.02) 56.8 (0.25) 95.5 (0.03) 82.0
ARO 88.7 (0.02) 54.9 (1.00) * 92.5 (0.02) 82.9 (0.09) 88.0
C1ofK 30.1 (0.25) 83.6 (0.01) 22.5 (1.00) * 93.3 (0.01) 69.0
CRO 94.3 (0.03) 87.5 (0.09) 96.1 (0.01) 70.5 (1.00) * 92.6
stronger if f(x) uses the same encoding as g(x). In addition, even though the same encoding is
used, RO models maintain higher robustness to the black-box attacks compared to 1ofK models
(e.g. 82.9% when CRO attacksARO vs. 56.8% when C1ofK attacks A1ofK ). This suggests that RO
encoding is more resilient to black-box attacks.
It is also evident from the results of this experiment in Table 2 that even when the source and target
models are the same, denoted by (*), RO encoding leads to better accuracy, and therefore robustness
to white-box attacks, compared to 1ofK encoding.
Finally, Table 2 also reports the correlation coefficient of sign(∇xLoss(f(x))) and
sign(∇xLoss(g(x))) in Eqn. 1. These gradients are significantly less correlated when the source
and target models use different encodings. In addition, RO results in a lower correlation compared to
1ofK when the same encoding is used in the source and target models.
We present ablation studies on our method in Section B in Appendix.
4.2 Benchmark Results
In this section we analyze the case where we combine our method with adversarial training (Eq 4).
We compare against the strong baseline of Madry et al. [5], which also uses adversarial training.
For adversarial training, we use a mix of clean and adversarial examples for MNIST, CIFAR-10,
and CIFAR-100, and adversarial examples only for SVHN following the experimental setup and the
threat models used by Madry et al. [5] and Buckman et al. [11]. We use PGD attacks with a random
start, and follow the PGD parameter configuration of [5, 9, 11].
We directly compare our method with the publicly released versions of Madry et al. [5] on MNIST
and CIFAR-10 in Table 3. We present results for 1K-step PGD black-box attacks generated from
the independently trained copy of Madry et al. (the first column) and the model trained with the
RO (the second column). It should be noted that the substitute model uses the same RO encoding
parameters used for the target model. We generate 1K-step PGD white-box attacks with a random
start. In addition, we generate 5K-step PGD attacks with 50 random restarts.
Table 3 demonstrates the robustness of multi-way encoding for black-box attacks, while at the same
time maintaining a high accuracy for white-box attacks and clean data.
The black-box attacks of the second column show the robustness even when an adversary knows the
exact value of the encoding used for the target model. We generate high-confidence PGD attacks
with Eq. 5 from the independently trained copy of the RO model. Our model still achieves higher
robustness compared to the baseline. In CIFAR-10, the black-box attacks from the RO model (i.e. the
substitute model uses the same RO encoding parameters) are much weaker than the black-box attacks
from the 1ofK model. This shows that RO can effectively decorrelate the target model even when
the encoding is exposed to an adversary. This is also consistent with the results in Fig. 2 (a) where the
correlation of gradients are lower and higher the black-box robustness of the RO models in Table 2
even when the substitute model uses the same RO encoding as the target model. In the third and
fourth columns, our defense also achieves higher robustness than the baseline on PGD white-box
attacks.
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Table 3: Comparison against the released models of Madry et al. [5] on white-box, black-box PGD
attacks, gradient-free attacks and on clean data. We report results on white and black-box PGD
attacks generated using the 1K iterations. We observe that our approach is more resilient to these
types of attacks and obtains improvements on clean data.
Dataset Model Accuracy (%)Blackbox
#steps:1K
(1ofK)
Blackbox
#steps:1K
(RO)
Whitebox
#steps:1K
Whitebox
#steps:5K
50-restarts
Gradient
-free Clean
MNIST Madry et al. [5] 94.9 95.0 92.2 89.6 35.4 98.4Ours 96.9 96.8 94.9 94.1 42.7 99.2
CIFAR-10 Madry et al. [5] 62.5 73.8 45.3 44.9 46.6 87.3Ours 65.2 72.2 53.1 52.4 56.9 89.4
Table 4: Evaluation on common corruptions and perturbations on CIFAR-10 [14]. Our method
obtains higher accuracy (test accuracy %) in all cases. (See Table 9 in Appendix for all perturbations.)
Model Corruptions
All Bright. Spatter Jpeg Elestic Motion Zoom Impulse Speckle
Madry et al. 81.5 87.1 81.6 85.4 81.7 80.4 82.7 68.8 81.8
Ours 83.4 89.3 84.4 87.1 83.2 81.6 84.0 72.0 84.3
We follow [15, 16] and perform gradient-free attacks to check for signs of obfuscated gradients.
In the fifth column, we evaluate our method on gradient-free attacks; (1) decision-based attacks
[17, 18] for MNIST and (2) query-based attacks [19] using Eq. 5 for CIFAR-10. It should be noted the
decision-based attacks are `2 bounded which violates our threat model. From the results, gradient-free
attacks could not break our defense and we do not observe a sign of obfuscated gradients.
Ford et al. [20] highlight the close relationship between adversarial robustness and general corruption
(e.g. Gaussian noise) robustness. They argue that a defense should have higher robustness on
general corruptions and recommend reporting corruption robustness as a sanity check for a defense.
Therefore, we evaluate our method’s general robustness, using the dataset of Hendrycks et al. [14]
that is designed to test the common corruptions and perturbations on CIFAR-10. As reported in
Table 4, we achieve higher robustness in all cases.
4.3 Further Evaluations
We train the method of Madry et al. and our approach on CIFAR-100 and SVHN. Fig. 3 represents
the robustness on black-box and white-box attacks on different PGD attack iterations. We also report
the clean accuracy when the iteration = 0.
Our method achieves higher robustness on the black-box and white-box attacks on CIFAR-100 and
SVHN. In addition, we also improve the clean accuracy by 7% on CIFAR-100.
In order to further evaluate our defense, we provide evaluations by following the guidelines of Athalye
et al. [8] to check if our method relies on obfuscated gradients. We include plots of intermediate PGD
attack iterations in Fig. 3. Transfer-based attacks can effectively check if a defense method relies
on obfuscated gradients [8]. Our model is robust to the transfer-based attacks from Madry et al.. In
addition, we observe that (1) the attack is converged; (2) iterative attacks are stronger than single-step
attacks; (3) white-box attacks are stronger than black-box attacks. From the evaluations above, we do
not find a sign of obfuscated gradients and our defense performs better than the baseline.
We present further analysis on white-box attacks in Sections C and D of Appendix.
5 Application: Attacking Model Watermarking
Zhang et al. [6] introduced an algorithm to detect whether a model is stolen or not. They do so
by adding a watermark to sample images of specific classes and deliberately training the model to
misclassify these examples to other specific classes. Even if their pre-trained model is stolen, the
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Figure 3: We generate PGD attacks with different number of iterations and compare our method
with the baseline by following [8]. Black-box attacks are generated from an independently trained
copy of the baseline. We observe that (1) the attack is converged; (2) iterative attacks are stronger
than single-step attacks; (3) white-box attacks are stronger than black-box attacks.
Finetune? Test Acc(%)
Watermarking
Acc (%)
StolenNet1ofK 7 84.7 98.6
Net1ofK 7 48.3 6.1
NetRO 7 48.0 10.0
Net1ofK X 85.6 87.8
NetRO X 80.2 12.9
Table 5: We present that RO en-
coding can fool the watermarking
detection by model decorrelation.
Fine-tuning using RO encoding
remarkably reduces transferability
of watermarked images (i.e. water-
marking acc) while taking advan-
tage of the pre-trained weights of
the stolen model.
model should make a misclassification on the watermarked image. This work has demonstrated to be
robust even when the model is fine-tuned on a different training set.
We interpret the watermarked image used to deliberately cause a misclassification as a transferable
adversarial example. We introduce an attack for this algorithm using our multi-way encoding,
making it more challenging to detect whether a model is stolen or not. We do this by fine-tuning the
stolen model using multi-way encoding, rather than the encoding used in pre-training the model. We
show that our multi-way encoding successfully decorrelate a model from the pre-trained model and,
as a result, adversarial examples become less transferable.
We follow the same CIFAR-10 experimental setup for detecting a stolen model as in Zhang et al.:
We split the test set into two halves. The first half is used to fine-tune pre-trained networks, and the
second half is used to evaluate new models. When we fine-tune the 1ofK model, we re-initialize
the last layer. When we fine-tune the RO model we replace the output encoding layer with our
2000-dimension fully-connected layer, drop the softmax, and freeze convolutional weights.
We present results on the CIFAR-10 dataset in Table 5. When the fine-tuning was performed using
the 1ofK encoding (also used in pre-training the model), watermarking detection is 87.8%, and
when the fine-tuning was performed using the multi-way RO encoding the watermarking detection is
only 12.9% while taking advantage of the pre-trained weights of the stolen model. The watermark
detection rate of the model fine-tuned using RO is significantly lower than that fine-tuned using
1ofK encoding, and is more comparable to models that are trained from scratch and do not use
the stolen model (6.1% and 10.0%). This results suggest that our multi-way encoding successfully
decorrelate the target model (finetuned NetRO) from the soruce model (Stolen Net1ofK).
6 Conclusion
By relaxing the 1ofK encoding to a real number encoding, together with increasing the encoding
dimensionality, our multi-way encoding decorrelates source and target models, confounding an
attacker by making it more difficult to perturb an input in gradient direction(s) that would result
in misclassification of a correctly classified example. We present stronger robustness on four
benchmark datasets for both black-box and white-box attacks and we improve classification accuracy
on clean data. We also demonstrate the strength of our approach by introducing an attack for model
watermarking, decorrelating a target model from the source model.
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Appendix
A Experimental Details
A.1 Dataset
MNIST [21] is a dataset of handwritten digits. It has a training set of 60K examples, and a test set of
10K examples. For MNIST, Madry et al. use 90% of the training set for training. We follow the same
training setup. CIFAR-10 [22] is a canonical benchmark for image classification and retrieval, with
60K images from 10 classes. The training set consists of 50K images, and the test set consists of
10K images. CIFAR-100 [22] is similar to CIFAR-10 in format, but has 100 classes containing 600
images each. Each class has 500 training images and 100 testing images. SVHN [23] is an image
dataset for recognizing street view house numbers obtained from Google Street View images. The
training set consists of 73K images, and the test set consists of 26K images.
A.2 Model Architecture
For MNIST and CIFAR-10, we follow the experimental settings in Madry et al. [5]; for MNIST we
use LeNet, for CIFAR-10 we use a ResNet [24] of Madry et al.. For CIFAR-100 and SVHN we
use a WideResNet [25] of depth 28 and 16, respectively, with a width factor 4 and a dropout of 0.3
following [11]. We use the optimizer used by [5, 11].
B Ablation Study on Encodings
We perform ablation studies to further investigate the effectiveness of our RO encoding. We train the
model used in Table 2 in the original manuscript with two different combinations of encodings and
loss functions. Please note that the two alternative models have 10 dimensions at the last layer while
RO has 2000 dimensions.
B.1 Alternative approach
B.1.1 ROsoftmax
We evaluate a network that uses RO encoding, a softmax layer, and cross-entropy loss. We compute
the probability of ith class as follows:
P (i|s) = exp(s
>ei)∑n
j=1 exp(s
>ej)
where s is the `2 normalized final layer representation, ei is the RO encoding vector (ground-truth
vector) from the codebook, and n is the number of classes.
B.1.2 1ofKMSE
We also evaluate a network that uses mean-squared error (MSE) loss with the 1ofK encoding.
B.2 Evaluation
We generate FGSM attacks with  = 0.2 from substitute models A1ofK and C1ofK on MNIST to
evaluate the models of Section B.1.1 and Section B.1.2. We also measure a correlation coefficient
of the sign of the input gradients between target and substitute models as explained in Section
4.1.1. Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate that RO, among the different target models, achieves the highest
accuracy and the lowest input gradient correlation with the substitute model. It should be noted
that the two alternative models have 10 neurons at the last layer while RO has 2000 neurons. In
addition, ROsoftmax has a softmax layer so that the gradients at the final layer are determined by a
ground-truth class of an example.
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Table 6: This table presents black-box attacks from the substitute model A1ofK on various target
models. RO achieves the highest accuracy and the lowest input gradient correlation with the substitute
model among the different target models.
Target
Model
A C
ROsoftmax 1ofKMSE RO ROsoftmax 1ofKMSE RO
Accuracy (%) 48.7 43.4 88.7 53.7 42.1 94.3
Correlation
Coefficient 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.1 0.13 0.03
Table 7: This table presents black-box attacks from the substitute model C1ofK on various target
models. RO achieves the highest accuracy and the lowest input gradient correlation with the substitute
model among the different target models.
Target
Model
A C
ROsoftmax 1ofKMSE RO ROsoftmax 1ofKMSE RO
Accuracy (%) 67.4 55.9 92.5 62.6 58.8 96.1
Correlation
Coefficient 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.1 0.01
C Checking for Signs of Obfuscated Gradients
In order to check if our method relies on obfuscated gradients [8], we report the accuracies on
white-box attacks by varying epsilon on CIFAR-10 in Table 8. Maximum allowed perturbation for
our model is 8/255, but we use larger epsilon to check the behavior of our model. We checked
that increasing distortion bound monotonically increase attack success rates and unbounded attacks
achieve 100% attack success rate.
Table 8: This table presents accuracies on white-box attacks by varying epsilon (`∞).
epsilon 2 4 6 10 12 14 18 20 Unbounded
Accuracy (%) 78.9 66.7 55.8 53.0 50.4 48.1 29.7 27 0
D Analysis on White-box Attacks
The goal of this section is to understand how our method improves white-box robustness in order
to further analyze our model. Following [26], we plot the landscapes of the loss of our method and
the value of neurons that correspond to ground-truth class of the baseline model [5] for CIFAR-10.
Since cross-entropy loss with a softmax layer can be biased to the norm of neuron values at the final
layer (Section 3 in [27]), we instead plot the value of the ground-truth neuron for the baseline model.
In Fig. 4, The x-axis represents the magnitude of the direction of r1 = sign(∇x′Loss(f(x′)) and
the y-axis represents the magnitude of a random direction, r2 ∼ Rademacher (0.5). For our model,
z-axis represents the mean squared error loss between the final encoding and the ground-truth vector
at each input data point (xadv = x′ + x ∗ r1 + y ∗ r2). For Madry et al., the z-axis represents the
value of the ground-truth neuron in the final layer which is directly responsible for the loss.
For Madry et al., the landscapes show linearity along with the direction of r1 for over the test
set regardless of misclassficiation. However, our model shows non-linear behaviors over correctly
classified examples but linear-like behaviors for misclassified examples. We show representative
landscapes from the three test points. Fig. 4 (a) shows the linearity along with the direction of r1 for
the baseline. The value of #4 decreases slowly but still shows linear behavior and the values of #2
and #9 decrease significantly. 4 argue that the linearity is a primary cause of vulnerability. We also
claim that the linear behavior makes it easier to find useful gradients. Fig. 4 (b), we observe that our
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#2 #4 #9
(a) Madry et al.
(b) Ours
Figure 4: Comparisons of landscapes of the baseline model of Madry et al. [5] and our model. The
x-axis represents the magnitude of the gradient direction of the loss w.r.t. input, the y-axis represents
the magnitude of a random direction, and the z-axis represents (a) the value of the ground-truth neuron
in the final layer for the baseline, and (b) the mean squared error loss between the final encoding and
the ground-truth vector at each input data point (xadv = x′ + x ∗ r1 + y ∗ r2). In this figure, we
depict the landscapes of x′ being the second, fourth, and ninth test examples in the CIFAR-10 dataset.
model shows non-linear behavior with the direction of r1 for the correctly classified examples: #2,
#4. For #9, the more linear-like behavior results in a much higher loss and misclassification.
When ground-truth vectors are one-hot encodings, decreasing the output value of the neuron cor-
responding to the ground-truth class significantly would cause a misclassification. However, when
ground-truth vectors are multi-way encodings, no single neuron is solely responsible for misclassi-
fication, but a more complex combination of neurons. Since the loss in our model is computed on
multiple neurons at the final layer, an adversarial direction may increase the loss of certain neurons
but it may also decrease the loss of other neurons at the same time. We argue that non-linearity is
related to our high dimensional encoding layer which provides additional robustness to white-box
attacks in addition to black-box attacks.
E Evaluation on common corruptions and perturbations on CIFAR-10
Table 9 reports all results on common corruptions and perturbations of CIFAR-10 [14].
F Transferability
In Table 3 of the main paper, the black-box attacks of the second column reports the robustness on
black-box attacks from the independently trained copy of the RO model. In this section, we analyze
the black-box attack accuracy on CIFAR-10 by varying confidence κ of Eq. 5 in the main paper.
The higher confidence makes an attack to be more confident misclassification. We observe that the
black-box attack accuracy converges at confidence= 1500. We report the lowest accuracy in Table 3.
G Related Work
Output encoding. There have been attempts to use alternate output encodings, also known as target
encodings, for image classification in deep models. For example, Yang et al. [28] and Rodriguez et
al. [29] use an output encoding that is based on Error-Correcting Output Codes (ECOC), for increased
performance and faster convergence, but not for adversarial defense. In contrast, we use an alternate
output encoding scheme, multi-way encoding, to make models more robust to adversarial attacks
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Table 9: This table presents the all results on common corruptions and perturbations on CIFAR-
10 [14]. Our method obtains higher test accuracy (%) in all cases.
Model Corruptions
Brightness Spatter Jpeg Elestic
Madry 87.1 81.7 85.4 81.7
Ours 89.3 84.4 87.1 83.2
Motion Zoom Impulse Speckle
Madry 80.4 82.7 68.8 81.8
Ours 81.6 84.0 72.0 84.3
Saturate Frost Gauss. noise Shot
Madry 84.3 85.5 82.2 82.8
Ours 86.3 87.8 84.3 85.1
Model Glass Fog Gauss. blur Pixelate
Madry 80.2 72.6 82.1 85.3
Ours 81.0 75.9 83.1 87.4
Contrast Defocus Snow AVG
Madry 77.0 83.6 82.6 81.5
Ours 78.9 85.0 84.7 83.4
Table 10: This table presents accuracies on black-box attacks from RO by varying confidence (κ).
We generate 1000-step PGD attacks on CIFAR-10.
confidence 10 300 1500 3000 6000
Accuracy (%) 83.0 80.9 72.2 72.2 72.2
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